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INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM ON
ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Glen Staszewski'
2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1
One of the most significant developments in public law over the past
quarter-century has been the resurgence of interest in statutory interpreta-
tion.' Until recently, virtually all of this scholarship has focused on the ju-
diciary's proper role in carrying out this enterprise in a representative de-
mocracy with separated powers. It is increasingly understood, however,
that the judiciary does not have primary responsibility for interpreting sta-
tutes in the modem regulatory state.2 Rather, this task is performed initially,
and often exclusively, by administrative agencies and other executive offi-
cials who have been delegated authority to implement federal programs.'
Yet, the manner in which the executive branch does and should carry out
this task has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention.' This Sym-
posium brings together some of the nation's leading scholars of administra-
tive law and legislation to build on this early work. These scholars were
asked to (1) comment on the manner in which administrative agencies and
other executive officials interpret regulatory statutes; (2) offer normative
propositions that could guide the executive branch in this enterprise; and (3)
* Associate Dean for Research & Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law. This Symposium benefitted from the valuable contributions of
many people. I am especially grateful to Mahfouz Ackall, Katherine Beasley, Noga Morag-
Levine, Sally Rice, and Cliff Thompson. I would also like to thank all of the Symposium
participants for devoting their considerable talents, efforts, and insights to this project.
1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992).
2. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 502-03 (2005)
(stating that "agencies are, by necessity, the primary official interpreters of federal statutes").
3. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1189, 1190, 1196 (2006) (recognizing that statutory interpretation is "a core
function of the executive branch," and explaining "that in a great many instances of execu-
tive branch statutory interpretation, the question ofjudicial review does not arise").
4. For some of the early work on this topic, see Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory In-
terpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function ofAgencies
and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673 (2007); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or
Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 889 (2007); Mashaw, supra note 2; Morrison, supra note
3; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Adminis-
ter: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 197 (2007); Peter L. Strauss,
When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpreta-
tion and the Problem ofLegislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321 (1990).
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explore the relevance of this learning for the judiciary when it reviews the
validity of agency action or interprets statutes in other contexts. The fol-
lowing contributions address these and other related questions from a varie-
ty of historical, empirical, and normative perspectives.
The Symposium begins by showing that even though the academic in-
terest in this topic is recent, administrative agencies and other executive
officials have engaged in statutory interpretation for a very long time. Jerry
Mashaw and Avi Perry claim that "well before the Civil War, national ad-
ministration in the United States was substantial, and statutes were never
self-interpreting."' Moreover, they explain that "statutory interpretation
was largely an administrative function at the national level because adminis-
trative action was virtually free from appellate-style judicial review."" Their
contribution provides an important examination of the structures and
processes for administrative interpretation in the early American republic,
which includes an unprecedented survey of every official opinion of the
twenty-four United States Attorneys General who served between 1789 and
1860, beginning with Edmund Randolph and ending with Jeremiah Black.!
Noga Morag-Levine reaches back even farther and looks across the
Atlantic to explore "the process through which the work of agencies came
to be equated with statutory interpretation under common law."' She traces
this development to a longstanding debate in England over the legitimacy of
prerogative royal authority that was available under the civil law in other
parts of Europe and whether this authority comported with common law
principles. When opponents of the royal prerogative prevailed at the end of
the seventeenth century, "the Crown's regulatory authority was subordi-
nated to parliament, and executive regulation could proceed only under sta-
tutory delegation. By definition, agency action became contingent on statu-
tory interpretation." Morag-Levine explains that the fundamental question
of "whether and when administrators [are] entitled to make, rather than
strictly interpret law" is still being contested in the United States, but the
terms of the debate have shifted to more familiar questions regarding the
permissible scope of delegation and the degree of deference that should be
accorded to statutory interpretation by agencies.o
With this historical background in mind, the Symposium proceeds to
explore the nature of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies in
5. Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the
Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 7, 10 (2009).
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. See id, at 11, 32 n.95.
8. Noga Morag-Levine, Agency Statutory Interpretation and the Rule of Common
Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 51, 52 (2009).
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id.
2 [Vol. 2009:1
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the modem regulatory state. Richard Pierce addresses the fundamental
question of which factors "an agency must, can, and cannot consider in
making a decision."" He claims that the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
had followed a consistent and sensible approach to these questions until
recent decisions by the Supreme Court, including Massachusetts v. EPA,12
significantly muddied the waters. Pierce sharply criticizes these decisions,
claims that they are best explained by the political and ideological prefe-
rences of the Justices, and calls for a return to an appropriate set of doctrines
on this important subject-which, he suggests, needs to be taken more se-
riously by the Court."
Pierce's recommended approach would essentially allow agencies to
consider any logically relevant factor that is not precluded from considera-
tion by statute when making a decision, which would presumably give
agencies flexibility to interpret statutes in a purposive fashion or one that
takes into account substantive background principles from the relevant field
of law. In this regard, Michael Herz explains that there has been an "institu-
tional turn" in recent literature on statutory interpretation, and he proceeds
to "examine the standard critiques of purposivism, developed with judges in
mind, and [to] consider whether th[o]se objections are strengthened, wea-
kened, or unaffected when it is an agency rather than a court that is doing
the interpreting."l 4 He concludes that almost without exception, those criti-
ques lose much of their force when applied to agencies, and agencies are
therefore "in a better position to interpret statutes in light of their purpose
than are courts.""
Similarly, Jonathan Siegel "examines the methodological implications
that follow from one of the distinctive characteristics of administrative
agencies, namely, their deep engagement with and knowledge of their or-
ganic statutes."'" He argues that "this distinctive degree of knowledge puts
agencies in a particularly good position to utilize an interpretive method
which gives special weight to substantive background principles of law and
which understands the meaning of statutory text in light of such background
principles." 7 He therefore concludes that in appropriate cases, agencies can
help to maintain a sound and coherent legal structure by ensuring that the
11. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a
Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 67, 67 (2009).
12. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
13. See Pierce, supra note 11, at 81-88.
14. Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 89, 91, 92 (2009).
15. Id. at 94.
16. Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 123, 124 (2009).
17. Id.
Spring] 3
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statutes they administer make sense in light of the background principles of
the relevant field of law.
While these persuasive contributions might suggest that "we are all
purposivists again,"" my own contribution, in effect, considers whether
modem textualists could agree with Herz or Siegel on a principled basis.'9 I
claim that the primary theoretical arguments for the new textualism apply
with full force to statutory interpretation by administrative agencies and
most other executive officials. Meanwhile, however, the proponents of this
methodology have endorsed a variety of legal doctrines that increase execu-
tive power in ways that are incompatible with textualist theory. Because
recent efforts by prominent textualists to explain the apparent tension be-
tween their theories of executive and judicial power are either beside the
point or unpersuasive, I conclude that their broader legal theory-which
simultaneously embraces the new textualism and relatively unbridled execu-
tive discretion-is fundamentally incoherent.
After discussing appropriate methodologies of statutory interpretation
by agencies in general, the Symposium considers the importance of the
identity of the executive officials who are interpreting a statute and the pro-
cedural format used by an agency to make its decision. Specifically, Mar-
garet Lemos examines the role of the Solicitor General in shaping the argu-
ments that reach the Supreme Court in cases that involve the interpretation
of statutes administered by federal agencies.20 She conducts an empirical
study of the briefs filed in the Supreme Court in every case involving agen-
cy statutory interpretation over more than two decades, and finds that the
relevant agency did not join the brief filed by the Solicitor General in twen-
ty-seven percent of those cases, which she suggests can serve as a rough
proxy for agency participation in the formulation of the arguments being
advanced. She claims that because the Solicitor General is more like the
Justices than the agencies on every significant point of comparison-
congressional intent, expertise, accountability, and public access-the Soli-
citor General's screening process "perpetuates a court-centered rather than
agency-centered mode of statutory interpretation."21
Meanwhile, Kevin Stack examines the relevance of an agency's poli-
cymaking form to its approach to statutory interpretation.22 He claims that
the considerations that ordinarily distinguish agency and judicial interpreta-
18. Cf Herz, supra note 14, at 109 & n.73 (citing literature proclaiming that at least
when it comes to the judiciary's role in statutory interpretation, "we are all textualists now").
19. See Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 143 (2009).
20. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and
Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 185 (2009).
21. Id. at 187.
22. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking Form,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 225 (2009).
4 [Vol. 2009:1
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tion, such as the appropriate role of politics and the relevance of resource
limitations, also have a significantly different place when the agency acts in
the context of rulemaking as opposed to formal adjudication. He therefore
suggests that an agency's choice of policymaking form may imply a differ-
ent approach to statutory interpretation-and that an agency's ability to
incorporate political preferences and budgetary concerns into its decisions
may be greater in the context of rulemaking than in the context of adjudica-
tion.
The Symposium concludes by examining administrative statutory in-
terpretation in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chevron and
Mead. Kristin Hickman examines the role and legal significance of various
forms of informal guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin by
the national office of the Internal Revenue Service.23 Not only does she
identify inconsistencies between the accepted wisdom and the contemporary
reality of this "IRB Guidance," but she also concludes that the contempo-
rary reality "pushes IRB Guidance directly into a large doctrinal void of
what it means for a rule to carry the force of law and the extent to which
that concept defines the intersection between Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) rulemaking procedures and judicial deference doctrine."24 For ex-
ample, she points out that the IRS's current litigating position is that IRB
Guidance is simultaneously exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures and entitled to Chevron deference.25 She therefore concludes
that "IRB guidance requires administrative law to confront questions thus
far left unanswered: what does the force of law mean, and does it mean the
same thing for purposes of APA rulemaking requirements and judicial defe-
rence?"26
As might be expected of any relatively new field of inquiry, there is
some underlying disagreement about the most fundamental questions that
this Symposium addresses. For example, Professors Mashaw and Pierce
have previously debated whether it even makes sense to think of agency
statutory interpretation as an autonomous enterprise.27  Even if it does,
which actors within the executive branch merit our attention? To the poten-
tial consternation of advocates of unitary executive theory, the executive
branch is not a monolith. Rather, statutory interpretation by the executive
branch will potentially be influenced by the views of the President, White
House agencies (such as OMB), the regulatory agencies themselves (both
within the executive branch and those that are formally independent), and
23. See Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land of Tax Code Inter-
pretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 239 (2009).
24. Id. at 242.
25. See id. at 260-64.
26. Id. at 271.
27. Compare Mashaw, supra note 4, with Pierce, supra note 4.
5Spring]
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the Department of Justice (including the Attorney General, the Solicitor
General, and the Office of Legal Counsel)-not to mention congressional
oversight and the prospect of judicial review. Indeed, there may even be
"turf wars" within agencies. The question of "who is in charge" and the
appropriate institutional hierarchy for authoritatively resolving issues of
statutory interpretation that arise within the executive branch will be heavily
influenced by one's views on the appropriate role of "politics" in this enter-
prise. And, of course, there is a wide range of perspectives on whether the
central role of politics in administrative statutory interpretation is something
to be celebrated or feared. I have learned a great deal from the contributions
that follow, and I look forward to future work on this incredibly complex
and fascinating topic.
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